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Abstract 
 
Over the last decade, a new idea challenging the 
classical  self-non-self  viewpoint  has  become 
popular amongst immunologists. It is called the 
Danger  Theory.  In  this  conceptual  paper,  we 
look  at  this  theory  from  the  perspective  of 
Artificial  Immune  System  practitioners.  An 
overview of the Danger Theory is presented with 
particular emphasis on analogies in the Artificial 
Immune Systems world. A number of potential 
application  areas  are  then  used  to  provide  a 
framing for a critical assessment of the concept, 
and its relevance for Artificial Immune Systems. 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, a new theory has become popular 
amongst immunologists. It is called the Danger Theory, 
and its chief advocate is Matzinger [18], [19] and [20]. A 
number  of  advantages  are  claimed  for  this  theory;  not 
least that it provides a method of ‘grounding’ the immune 
response. The theory is not complete, and there are some 
doubts about how much it actually changes behaviour and 
/ or structure. Nevertheless,  the theory contains enough 
potentially interesting ideas to make it worth assessing its 
relevance to Artificial Immune Systems. 
It should be noted that we do not intend to defend this 
theory,  which  is  still  controversial  [21].  Rather  we  are 
interested  in  its  merits  for  Artificial  Immune  System 
applications and hence its actual existence in the humoral 
immune system is of little importance to us. Our question 
is: Can it help us build better Artificial Immune Systems? 
Few  other  Artificial  Immune  System  practitioners  are 
aware  of  the  Danger  Theory,  notable  exceptions  being 
Burgess [5] and Willamson [22]. Hence, this is the first 
paper that deals directly with the Danger Theory, and it is 
the authors’ intention that this paper stimulates discussion 
in our research community. 
In the next section, we provide an overview of the Danger 
Theory, pointing out, where appropriate, some analogies 
in  current  Artificial  Immune  System  models.  We  then 
assess the relevance of the theory for Artificial Immune 
System security applications, which is probably the most 
obvious  application  area  for  the  danger  model.  Other 
Artificial  Immune  System  application  areas  are  also 
considered.  Finally,  we  draw  some  preliminary 
conclusions about the potential of the Danger concept. 
2  THE DANGER THEORY 
The  immune  system  is  commonly  thought  to  work  at 
three  levels:  External  barriers  (skin,  mucus),  innate 
immunity and the acquired or adaptive immune system. 
As  part  of  the  third  and  most  complex  level,  B-
Lymphocytes  secrete  specific  antibodies  that  recognise 
and react to stimuli. It is this pattern matching between 
antibodies  and  antigens  that  lies  at  the  heart  of  most 
Artificial Immune System implementations. Another type 
of  cell,  the  T  (killer)  lymphocyte,  is  also  important  in 
different types of immune reactions. Although not usually 
present  in  Artificial  Immune  System  models,  the 
behaviour of this cell is implicated in the Danger model 
and so it is included here.  From the  Artificial Immune 
System  practitioner’s  point  of  view,  the  T  killer  cells 
match stimuli in much the same way as antibodies do. 
However, it is not simply a question of matching in the 
humoral immune system. It is fundamental that only the 
‘correct’ cells are matched as otherwise this could lead to 
a  self-destructive  autoimmune  reaction.  Classical 
immunology [12] stipulates that an immune response is 
triggered when the body encounters something non-self or 
foreign. It is not yet fully understood how this self-non-
self discrimination is achieved, but many immunologists 
believe that the difference between them is learnt early in 
life. In particular it is thought that the maturation process 
plays  an  important  role  to  achieve  self-tolerance  by 
eliminating  those  T  and  B  cells  that  react  to  self.  In 
addition, a ‘confirmation’ signal is required; that is, for 
either  B  cell  or  T  (killer)  cell  activation,  a  T  (helper) 
lymphocyte must also be activated. This dual activation is further  protection  against  the  chance  of  accidentally 
reacting to self. 
Matzinger’s  Danger  Theory  debates  this  point  of  view 
(for a good introduction, see Matzinger [18]). Technical 
overviews can be found in Matzinger [19] and Matzinger 
[20].  She  points  out  that  there  must  be  discrimination 
happening that goes beyond the self-non-self distinction 
described above. For instance: 
•  There is no immune reaction to foreign bacteria in the 
gut or to the food we eat although both are foreign 
entities. 
•  Conversely, some auto-reactive processes are useful, 
for  example  against  self  molecules  expressed  by 
stressed cells. 
•  The definition of self is problematic – realistically, 
self  is  confined  to  the  subset  actually  seen  by  the 
lymphocytes during maturation. 
•  The human body changes over its lifetime and thus 
self changes as well. Therefore, the question arises 
whether  defences  against  non-self  learned  early  in 
life might be autoreactive later. 
•  Other  aspects  that  seem  to  be  at  odds  with  the 
traditional  viewpoint  are  autoimmune  diseases  and 
certain  types  of  tumours  that  are  fought  by  the 
immune  system  (both  attacks  against  self)  and 
successful transplants (no attack against non-self). 
Matzinger  concludes  that  the  immune  system  actually 
discriminates “some self from some non-self”. She asserts 
that the Danger Theory introduces not just new labels, but 
a way of escaping the semantic difficulties with self and 
non-self,  and  thus  provides  grounding  for  the  immune 
response. If we accept the Danger Theory as valid we can 
take  care  of  ‘non-self  but  harmless’  and  of  ‘self  but 
harmful’  invaders  into  our  system.  To  see  how  this  is 
possible,  we  will  have  to  examine  the  theory  in  more 
detail. 
The central idea in the Danger Theory is that the immune 
system does not respond to non-self but to danger. Thus, 
just  like  the  self-non-self  theories,  it  fundamentally 
supports the need for discrimination. However, it differs 
in the answer to what should be responded to. Instead of 
responding to foreignness, the immune system reacts to 
danger. 
This theory is borne out of the observation that there is no 
need to attack everything that is foreign, something that 
seems to be supported by the counter examples above. In 
this  theory,  danger  is  measured  by  damage  to  cells 
indicated by distress signals that are sent out when cells 
die an unnatural death (cell stress or lytic cell death, as 
opposed to programmed cell death, or apoptosis). 
Figure  1  depicts  how  we  might  picture  an  immune 
response according to the Danger Theory. A cell that is in 
distress sends out an alarm signal, whereupon antigens in 
the  neighbourhood  are  captured  by  antigen-presenting 
cells such as macrophages, which then travel to the local 
lymph  node  and  present  the  antigens  to  lymphocytes. 
Essentially, the danger signal establishes a danger zone 
around  itself.  Thus  B  cells  producing  antibodies  that 
match antigens within the danger zone get stimulated and 
undergo the clonal expansion process. Those that do not 
match  or  are  too  far  away  do  not  get  stimulated.
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Figure 1: Danger Theory Model. Matzinger  admits  that  the  exact  nature  of  the  danger 
signal  is  unclear.  It  may  be  a  ‘positive’  signal  (for 
example heat shock protein release) or a ‘negative’ signal 
(for  example  lack  of  synaptic  contact  with  a  dendritic 
antigen-presenting cell). This is where the Danger Theory 
shares some of the problems associated with traditional 
self-non-self  discrimination  (i.e.  how  to  discriminate 
danger  from  non-danger).  However,  in  this  case,  the 
signal  is  grounded  rather  than  being  some  abstract 
representation of danger. 
Another way of looking at the danger model is to see it as 
an extension of the Two-Signal model by Bretscher and 
Cohn  [4].  In  this  model,  the  two  signals  are  antigen 
recognition (signal one) and co-stimulation (signal two). 
Co-stimulation is a signal that means “this antigen really 
is foreign” or, in the Danger Theory, “this antigen really 
is  dangerous”.  How  the  signal  arises  will  be  explained 
later. The Danger Theory then operates by applying three 
laws  to  lymphocyte  behaviour  (the  laws  of  lymphotics 
[20]): 
•  Law 1. Become activated if you receive signals one 
and two together. Die if you receive signal one in the 
absence  of  signal  two.  Ignore  signal  two  without 
signal one. 
•  Law  2.  Accept  signal  two  from  antigen-presenting 
cells  only  (or,  for  B  cells,  from  T  helper  cells). B 
cells  can  act  as  antigen-presenting  cells  only  for 
experienced (memory) T cells. Note that signal one 
can come from any cells, not just antigen-presenting 
cells. 
•  Law 3. After activation (activated cells do not need 
signal two) revert to resting state after a short time. 
For  the  mature  lymphocyte,  (whether  virgin  or 
experienced) these rules are adhered to. However, there 
are two exceptions in the lymphocyte lifecycle. Firstly, 
immature cells are unable to accept signal two from any 
source.  This  enables  an  initial  negative  selection 
screening  to  occur.  Secondly,  activated  (effector)  cells 
respond  only  to  signal  one  (ignoring  signal  two),  but 
revert to the resting state shortly afterwards. 
An implication of this theory is that autoreactive effects 
are  not  necessarily  harmful,  and  are  in  fact  expected 
during  an  infection.  This  is  because  any  lymphocyte 
reacting  to  an  antigen  in  the  ‘danger  zone’  will  be 
activated. These antigens are not necessarily the culprits 
for  the  danger  signal.  If  they  are,  then  the  reacting 
lymphocytes  will  continue  to  be  restimulated  until  the 
antigens (and therefore the danger signal) are removed. 
After this, they will rest, receiving neither signal one nor 
signal two. 
On  the  other  hand,  lymphocytes  reacting  to  innocuous 
(self) antigens  will continue  to receive signal one from 
these antigens, even after the danger (and therefore signal 
two) has vanished. Therefore these lymphocytes will be 
deleted, and tolerance will be achieved. However, further 
autoreactive effects can be expected, partly because ‘self’ 
changes over time, and partly because of new lymphocyte 
generation  (particularly  B  cells,  which  produce 
hypermutated clones during activation). 
A problem is posed by the antigen-presenting cell itself, 
whose (innocuous) antigens  are by  definition always in 
the danger zone. Lymphocytes reacting to these antigens 
might  destroy  the  antigen-presenting  cell  and  thus 
interfere  with  the  immune  response.  The  negative 
selection of immature lymphocytes protects against this 
possibility. 
Figure 2 shows a more detailed picture of how the Danger 
Theory can be viewed as an extension of immune signals. 
These  diagrams  are  adapted  from  those  presented  in 
Matzinger [19] except for the sixth,  which incorporates 
suggestions made in Matzinger [20]. 
In  the  original  view  of  the  world  by  Burnet  [6],  only 
signal  one  is  considered.  This  is  shown  in  the  first 
diagram,  where  the  only  signal  shown  is  that  between 
infectious  agents  and  lymphocytes  (B  cells,  marked  B, 
and T killer, marked Tk). Signal two (second diagram) 
was introduced by Bretscher and Cohn [4]. This helper 
signal comes from a T helper cell (marked Th), on receipt 
of signal one from the B cell. That is, the B cell presents 
antigens  to  the  T  helper  cell  and  awaits  the  T  cell’s 
confirmation signal. If the T cell recognises the antigen 
(which, if negative selection has worked, should mean the 
antigen  is  non-self)  then  the  immune  response  can 
commence.  It  was  Lafferty  and  Cuningham  [17]  who 
proposed that the T helper cells themselves also need to 
be  ‘switched  on’  by  signals  one  and  two,  both  from 
antigen-presenting cells. This process is depicted in the 
third diagram. 
Note  that  the  T  helper  cell  gets  signal  one  from  two 
sources – the B cell and the antigen-presenting cell. In the 
former case the antigens are not chosen randomly – the 
very  opposite,  since  B  cells  are  highly  selective  for  a 
range of (hopefully non-self) antigens. In the latter case, 
the antigens are chosen randomly (the antigen-presenting 
cell simply presents any antigen it picks up) but signal 
two should only be provided to the T helper cell for non-
self antigens. It is not necessarily clear how the antigen-
presenting cell ‘knows’ the antigen is non-self. Janeway 
[14]  introduced  the  idea  of  infectious  non-self  (for 
example  bacteria),  which  ‘primes’  antigen  presenting 
cells,  i.e.  causing  signal  two  to  be  produced  (fourth 
diagram). This priming signal is labelled as signal 0 in the 
figures. 
Matzinger  proposes  to  allow  priming  of  antigen-
presenting cells by a danger signal (fifth diagram). She 
also proposes to extend the efficacy of T helper cells by 
routing signal two through antigen presenting cells [20]. 
We have marked this as ‘signal 3’ in the sixth diagram 
(although Matzinger does not use that term, the intention 
is clear). In Matzinger’s words “the antigen seen by the 
killer  need  not  be  the  same  as  the  helper;  the  only 
requirement is that they  must both  be presented by the 
same antigen-presenting cell”. This arrangement allows T 
helper cells to prime many more T killer cells than they 
would otherwise have been able to. Tk
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Figure 2: Danger Theory viewed as immune signals. 
 
The  Danger  Theory  is  not  without  its  limitations.  As 
mentioned, the exact nature of the danger signal is still 
unclear. Also, there is sometimes danger that should not 
be responded to (cuts, transplants). In fact, in the case of 
transplants  it  is  often  necessary  to  remove  the  antigen-
presenting cells from the transplanted organ. Finally, the 
fact that autoimmune diseases do still, if rarely, happen, 
has yet to be fully reconciled with the Danger Theory. 
3  THE DANGER THEORY AND SOME 
ANALOGIES TO ARTIFICIAL 
IMMUNE SYSTEMS 
Danger theory clearly has many facets and intricacies, and 
we have touched on only a few. It might be instructive to 
list a number of considerations for an Artificial Immune 
System practitioner regarding the suitability of the danger 
model  for  their  application.  The  basic  consideration  is whether negative selection is important. If so, then these 
points may be relevant: 
•  Negative  selection  is  bound  to  be  imperfect,  and 
therefore  autoreactions  (false  positives)  are 
inevitable.  
•  The self/non-self boundary is blurred since self and 
non-self antigens often share common regions.   
•  Self  changes  over  time.  Therefore,  one  can  expect 
problems with memory cells, which later turn out to 
be inaccurate or even autoreactive. 
If  these  points  are  sufficient  to  make  a  practitioner 
consider incorporating the Danger theory into their model, 
then the following considerations may be instructive: 
1.  A danger model requires an antigen-presenting cell, 
which can present an appropriate danger signal. 
2.  ‘Danger’ is an emotive term. The signal  may have 
nothing  to  do  with  danger  (see,  for  example,  our 
discussion on data mining applications in section 5). 
3.  The  appropriate  danger  signal  can  be  positive 
(presence of signal) or negative (absence). 
4.  The danger zone  in biology  is spatial. In  Artificial 
Immune System applications, some other measure of 
proximity (for instance temporal) may be used. 
5.  If  there  is  an  analogue  of  an  immune  response,  it 
should not lead to further danger signals. In biology, 
killer cells cause a normal cell death, not danger. 
6.  Matzinger proposes priming killer cells via antigen-
presenting cells for greater effect. Depending on the 
immune  system  used  (it  only  makes  sense  for 
spatially  distributed  models)  this  proposal  may  be 
relevant. 
7.  There  are  a  variety  of  considerations  that  are  less 
directly  related  to  the  danger  model.  For  example, 
migration  –  how  many  antibodies  receive  signal 
one/two  from  a  given  antigen-presenting  cell?  In 
addition, the danger theory relies on concentrations, 
i.e. continuous not binary matching. 
There  are  also  a  couple  of  points  that  might  tempt  a 
practitioner to alter the danger model as presented here. 
For  example,  the  danger  model  has  quite  a  number  of 
elements. Given that the antigen-presenting cell mediates 
the danger signal, we might be able to simplify the model 
–  for  example,  do  we  still  need  a  T  helper  cell?  In 
addition, there are some danger signals that might in some 
sense  be  ‘appropriate’  and  thus  should  not  trigger  an 
immune response. In such cases, a method for avoiding 
the danger pathway must be found. A biological example 
is transplanted organs, in which antigen-presenting cells 
are removed. 
4  THE DANGER THEORY AND 
ANOMALY DETECTION 
An  intriguing  area  for  the  application  of  Artificial 
Immune  Systems  is  the  detection  of  anomalies  such  as 
computer  viruses,  fraudulent  transactions  or  hardware 
faults. The underlying metaphor seems to fit particularly 
nicely  here,  as  there  is  a  system  (self)  that  has  to  be 
protected  against  intruders  (non-self).  Thus  if  natural 
immune  systems  have  enabled  biological  species  to 
survive, can we not create Artificial Immune Systems to 
do the same to our computers, machines etc? Presumably 
those  systems  would  then  have  the  same  beneficial 
properties as natural immune systems like error tolerance, 
distribution,  adaptation  and  self-monitoring.  A  recent 
overview of biologically inspired approaches to this area 
can be found in Williamson [22]. 
In this section we will present indicative examples of such 
artificial systems, explain their current shortcomings and 
show how the Danger Theory might help overcome some 
of these. 
One of the first such approaches is presented by Forrest et 
al [11] and extended by Hofmeyr and Forrest [13]. This 
work  is  concerned  with  building  an  Artificial  Immune 
System  that  is  able  to  detect  non-self  in  the  area  of 
network  security  where  non-self  is  defined  as  an 
undesired  connection.  All  connections  are  modelled  as 
binary strings and there is a set of known good and bad 
connections,  which  is  used  to  train  and  evaluate  the 
algorithm.  To  build  the  Artificial  Immune  System, 
random binary strings are created called detectors. 
These detectors then undergo a maturation phase where 
they are presented with good, i.e. self, connections. If they 
match  any  of  these  they  are  eliminated  otherwise  they 
become mature, but not activated. If during their further 
lifetime  these  mature  detectors  match  anything  else, 
exceeding  a  certain  threshold  value,  they  become 
activated. This is then reported to a human operator who 
decides  whether  there  is  a  true  anomaly.  If  so  the 
detectors  are  promoted  to  memory  detectors  with  an 
indefinite  life  span  and  minimum  activation  threshold. 
Thus,  this  is  similar  to  the  secondary  response  in  the 
natural immune system, for instance after immunisation. 
An  approach  such  as  the  above  is  known  in  Artificial 
Immune  Systems  as  negative  selection  as  only  those 
detectors  (antibodies)  that  do  not  match  live  on.  It  is 
thought  that  T  cells  mature  in  similar  fashion  in  the 
thymus such that only those survive and mature that do 
not match any self cells after a certain amount of time. 
An alternative approach to negative selection is that of 
positive selection as used for instance by Forrest et al [9] 
and by Somayaji and Forrest [22]. These systems are a 
reversal  of  the  negative  selection  algorithm  described 
above  with  the  difference  that  detectors  for  self  are 
evolved.  From  a  performance  point  of  view  there  are 
advantages  and  disadvantages  for  both  methods.  A 
suspect non-self string would have to be compared with 
all self-detectors to establish that it is non-self, whilst with negative selection the first matching detector would stop 
the comparison. On the other hand, for a self-string this is 
reversed giving positive selection the upper hand. Thus, 
performance depends on the self to non-self ratio, which 
should generally favour positive selection. 
However,  there  is  another  difference  between  the  two 
approaches:  the  nature  of  false  alarms.  With  negative 
selection  inadequate  detectors  will  result  in  false 
negatives  (missed  intrusions)  whilst  with  positive 
selection there will be false positives (false alarms). The 
preference  between  the  two  in  this  case  is  likely  to  be 
problem specific. 
Both  approaches  have  been  extended  further  [10] 
including  better  co-stimulation  methods  and  activation 
thresholds to reduce the number of false alarms, multiple 
antibody  sub-populations  for  improved  diversity  and 
coverage and improved partial matching rules. Recently, 
similar approaches have also been used to detect hardware 
faults (Bradley and Tyrrell [1]), network intrusion (Kim 
and Bentley [16]) and fault tolerance (Burgess [5]). 
What are the remaining challenges for a successful use of 
Artificial  Immune  Systems  for  anomaly  detection? 
Firstly, self and non-self will usually evolve and change 
during the lifetime of the system. Hence, to be effective, 
any system used must be robust and flexible enough to 
cope  with  changing  circumstances.  Based  on  the 
performance  of  their  natural  counterparts,  Artificial 
Immune Systems should be well suited to provide these 
qualities.  Secondly,  appropriate  representations  of  self 
and  good  matching  rules  have  to  be  developed.  Most 
research so far has been concentrated in these two areas 
and good advances have been made so far [8]. 
However, as pointed out by Kim and Bentley [15], scaling 
is a problem with negative selection. As the systems to be 
protected grow larger and larger so does self and non-self 
and it becomes more and more problematic to find a set of 
detectors  that  provides  adequate  coverage  whilst  being 
computationally  efficient.  It  is  inefficient,  if  not 
impossible,  to  map  the  entire  non-self  universe, 
particularly as it will be changing over time. The same 
applies to positive selection and trying to map all of self. 
Moreover,  the  approaches  so  far  have  another 
disadvantage:  A  response  requires  infection  beyond  a 
certain threshold and human intervention confirming this. 
Although  one  might  argue  that  the  operator  sees  fewer 
alarms than in an unaided system, this clearly is not yet 
the ideal situation of an autonomous system preventing all 
damage. Apart from the resource implication of a human 
component, an unduly long delay might be caused by this 
necessity prolonging the time the system is exposed. This 
situation might be further aggravated by the fact that the 
labels self and non-self are often ambiguous and expert 
knowledge might be required to apply them correctly. 
How can these problems be overcome? We believe that 
applying ideas from the Danger Theory can help building 
better Artificial Immune Systems by providing a different 
way of grounding and removing the necessity to map self 
or non-self. To achieve this self-non-self discrimination 
will still be useful but it is no longer essential. This is 
because non-self no longer causes an immune response. 
Instead, it will be danger signals that trigger a reaction. 
What could such danger signals be? They should show up 
after  limited  infection  to  minimise  damage  and  hence 
have to be quickly and automatically measurable. Suitable 
signals could include: 
•  Too low or too high memory usage. 
•  Inappropriate disk activity. 
•  Unexpected  frequency  of  file  changes  as  measured 
for example by checksums or file size. 
•  SIGABRT signal from abnormally terminated UNIX 
processes. 
•  Presence of non-self. 
Of  course,  it  would  also  be  possible  to  use  ‘positive’ 
signals, as discussed in the previous section, such as the 
absence of some normal ‘health’ signals. 
Once the danger signal has been transmitted, the immune 
system  can  then  react  to  those  antigens,  for  example, 
executables or connections, which are ‘near’ the emitter 
of the danger signal. Note that ‘near’ does not necessarily 
mean geographical or physical closeness, something that 
might make sense for connections and their IP addresses 
but probably not for computer executables in general. In 
essence,  the  physical  ‘near’  that  the  Danger  Theory 
requires for the immune system is a proxy measure for 
causality.  Hence,  we  can  substitute  it  with  more 
appropriate causality measures such as similar execution 
start  times,  concurrent  runtimes  or  access  of  the  same 
resources. 
Consequently,  those  antibodies  or  detectors  that  match 
(first signal) those antigens within a radius, defined by a 
measure  such  as  the  above  (second  signal),  will 
proliferate.  Having  thereby  identified  the  dangerous 
components, further confirmation could then be sought by 
sending  it  to  a  special  part  of  the  system  simulating 
another attack. This would have the further advantage of 
not  having  to  send  all  detectors  to  confirm  danger.  In 
conclusion, using these ideas from the Danger Theory has 
provided  a  better  grounding  of  danger  labels  in 
comparison  to  self  /  non-self,  whilst  at  the  same  time 
relying less on human competence. 
5  THE DANGER THEORY AND OTHER 
ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEM 
APPLICATIONS 
It  is  not  immediately  obvious  how  the  Danger  Theory 
could  be  of  use  to  data  mining  problems  such  as  the 
movie  prediction  problem  described  in  Cayzer  and 
Aickelin [7], because the notions of self and non-self are 
not used. In essence, in data mining all of the system is 
self. More precisely, it is not an issue what is self or non-
self as the designer of the database has complete control 
over this aspect. However,  if  the  labels  self  and  non-self  were  to  be 
replaced  by  interesting  and  non-interesting  data  for 
example,  a  distinction  would  prove  beneficial.  In  this 
case, the immune system is being applied as a classifier. If 
one  can  then  further  assume  that  interesting  data  is 
located ‘close’ or ‘near’ to other interesting data, ideas 
from the Danger Theory can come into play again. To do 
so, it is necessary to define ‘close’ / ‘near’. We could use: 
•  Physical  closeness,  for  instance  distance  in  the 
database as measured by an appropriate metric. 
•  Correlation of data, as measured by statistical tools. 
•  Similar entry times into the database. 
•  File size. 
A danger signal could thus be interpreted as a valuable 
piece  of  information  that  has  been  uncovered.  Hence, 
those  antibodies  are  stimulated  that  match  data  that  is 
‘close’ this valuable piece of information. 
Taking  this  idea  further,  we  might  define  the  danger 
signal  as  an  indication  of  user  interest.  Given  this 
definition,  we  can  speculate  about  various  scenarios  in 
which  the  danger  signal  could  be  of  use.  One  such 
scenario is outlined below for illustrative purposes. 
Imagine  a  user  browsing  a  set  of  documents.  Each 
document  has  a  set  of  features  (for  instance  keywords, 
title,  author,  date  etc).  Imagine  further  that  there  is  an 
immune  system  implemented  as  a  ‘watcher’,  whose 
antibodies  match  document  features.  ‘Interesting’ 
documents are those, whose features are matched by the 
immune system. 
When  a  user  either  explicitly  or  implicitly  indicates 
interest  in  the  current  document,  a  “danger”  signal  is 
raised. This causes signal two to be passed, along with 
signal  one,  to  antibodies  matching  any  antigen,  i.e. 
document feature, in the danger zone, i.e. this document. 
Stimulated  antibodies  become  effectors,  and  thus  the 
immune  system  learns  to  become  a  good  filter  when 
searching  for  other  interesting  documents.  Interesting 
documents could be brought to the user’s attention (the 
exact  mechanism  is  not  relevant  here).  The  important 
thing is that the user’s idea of an ‘interesting’ document 
may  change  over  time  and  so  it  is  important  that  the 
immune system adapts in a timely way to such a changing 
definition of (non-) self. 
Meanwhile,  every  document  browsed  by  the  user 
(whether  interesting  or  not)  will  be  presented  to  the 
antibodies  as  ‘signal  one’.  Uninteresting  document 
features  will  therefore  give  rise  to  signal  one  without 
signal two, which will tolerate the autoreactive antibodies. 
The net effect is to produce a set of antibodies that match 
only interesting document features.  
As  mentioned,  this  example  is  purely  illustrative  but  it 
does show that ideas from the Danger theory may have 
implications for Artificial Immune System applications in 
domains  where  the  relevance  of  ‘danger’  is  far  from 
obvious. 
6  CONCLUSIONS 
To  conclude,  the  Danger  Theory  is  not  about  the  way 
Artificial  Immune  Systems  represent  data.  Instead,  it 
provides  ideas  about  which  data  the  Artificial  Immune 
Systems  should  represent  and  deal  with.  They  should 
focus on dangerous, i.e. interesting data. 
It could be argued that the shift from non-self to danger is 
merely a symbolic label change that achieves nothing. We 
do  not  believe  this  to  be  the  case,  since  danger  is  a 
grounded signal, and non-self is (typically) a set of feature 
vectors with no further information about their meaning. 
The  danger  signal  helps  us  to  identify  which  subset  of 
feature vectors is of interest. A suitably defined danger 
signal thus overcomes many of the limitations of self-non-
self  selection.  It  restricts  the  domain  of  non-self  to  a 
manageable size, removes the need to screen against all 
self, and deals adaptively  with scenarios where self (or 
non-self) changes over time.  
The challenge is clearly to define a suitable danger signal, 
a  choice  that  might  prove  as  critical  as  the  choice  of 
fitness function for an evolutionary algorithm. In addition, 
the physical distance in the biological system should be 
translated into a suitable proxy measure for similarity or 
causality in an Artificial Immune System. We have made 
some suggestions in this paper about how to tackle these 
challenges in a variety of domains, but the process is not 
likely to be trivial. Nevertheless, if these challenges are 
met,  then  future  Artificial  Immune  System  applications 
might derive considerable benefit, and new insights, from 
the Danger Theory. 
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